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Choosing between equivalent response options requires the resolution of ambiguity. One could 12 
facilitate such decisions by monitoring previous actions and implementing transient or 13 
arbitrary rules to differentiate response options. This would reduce the entropy of chosen 14 
actions. We examined voluntary action decisions during magnetoencephalography, identifying 15 
the spatiotemporal correlates of stimulus- and choice-entropy. Negative correlations between 16 
frontotemporal activity and entropy of past trials were observed after participants’ responses, 17 
reflecting sequential monitoring of recent events. In contrast, choice entropy correlated 18 
negatively with prefrontal activity, before and after participants’ response, consistent with 19 
transient activation of latent response-sets ahead of a decision and updating the monitor of 20 
recent decisions after responding. Individual differences in current choices were related to the 21 
strength of the prefrontal signals that reflect monitoring of the statistical regularities in 22 
previous events. Together, these results explain individual expressions of voluntary action, 23 





The brain is adept at identifying and representing regularities within a dynamic sensory 27 
environment, such as the identification of rhythms in auditory streams 1,2, recurrent visual 28 
features embedded in complex objects 3, and the transitional relationships between elements in 29 
artificial grammars 4. Implicit learning of the statistics of event regularity is evident from early 30 
in development 5. These expectations adaptively influence behavior, and facilitate preferential 31 
responses to new events 6.  32 
Statistical regularities span different timescales, which map onto a rostral-caudal gradient of 33 
neural representations 7. While the analysis of shorter sequences relies on the basal ganglia 8,9, 34 
regularities from temporally extended sequences (tens of seconds) have been associated with 35 
the prefrontal cortex 10,11. The neural response to regularities is established across multiple 36 
sensory modalities 12,13, whether in fixed event blocks 14,15, over all previous events 16,17 or 37 
during varying time windows 11. 38 
Sequential voluntary actions also contain statistical regularities. Where action decisions cannot 39 
be explained by objective differences in outcome or reward, individual differences in the 40 
degree of regularity provide critical insights into the mechanisms of volition 18. Volition is 41 
integral to normal human behavior, and many neurological disorders are characterized by 42 
changes in volition, with corresponding differences in regularity, entropy or stereotypy of 43 
behaviors 19. This study therefore lies in the broader context of willed action and volitional 44 
decision making. Voluntary actions encompass everyday decisions that are not by reflex or 45 
forced by some external stimulus or specified rule (over and above the willingness to adhere to 46 
such instructions) 20. They are sometimes considered internally-driven decisions or consciously 47 
attended to 21,22 or associated with a sense of agency when making choices between possible 48 
options 23,24. However, terms such as “free-will” or “free selection” of action are poorly 49 
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operationalized, and open to highly variable interpretation: there are often implied or actual 50 
constraints on the range of actions from which to choose. Instead, we propose analysing such 51 
tasks in terms of decision-making and choice. Cortical regions consistently associated with 52 
action selection include parietal 25,26 premotor 27,28 and prefrontal areas 29,30. Conversely, 53 
abnormal statistical dependencies in the form of perseveration and stereotypies are often 54 
associated with dysfunction of the prefrontal cortex and its striatal connections 31, including 55 
Parkinson’s disease and progressive supranuclear palsy 32, Tourette syndrome 33 and 56 
frontotemporal dementia 34.  57 
Based on an fMRI study of voluntary action selection, we recently proposed two mechanisms 58 
by which the prefrontal cortex introduces regularity to sequential voluntary behaviors 11. 59 
Firstly, by monitoring serial actions, it introduces a bias towards selection of previously under-60 
represented choices 35. Secondly, it facilitates the implementation of transient and arbitrary 61 
response rules. Such rules are not essential for voluntary action, but may serve to reduce the 62 
effort required to resolve ambiguity where the selection between action alternatives is not 63 
facilitated by differential rewards 36–39. A simple rule might be the inhibition of repetition of 64 
sequential choices 18 analogous to inhibition of return demonstrated in attention and saccades 65 
40,41. For example, Zhang et al. (2012) demonstrated that prefrontal cortical activation brakes 66 
the activation of premotor representation of recent actions, leading to regularising of behavior. 67 
Neuropsychological and fMRI studies are not able to determine whether prefrontal cortical 68 
activity related to selection regularity occurs before the selection of action or afterwards. 69 
Regularisation activity before the response suggests a constraint on the current choice, for 70 
example by a transient rule that reduces effort by minimising uncertainty 42. In contrast, 71 
regularisation related activity after the response suggests the monitoring of behavior, or the 72 
updating of a heuristic response-set.  73 
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We therefore exploited the temporal resolution of magnetoencephalography (MEG) to 74 
investigate how the degree of regularity in past events modulates present evoked responses. 75 
Using a task in which participants are instructed to make a specified action or are given a 76 
choice of actions to make, we used entropy to measure types of regularity, quantified as the 77 
degree of regularity in past trial events (Trial Entropy, TE) and the degree of regularity of 78 
participants’ voluntary action decisions (Selection Entropy, SE). Entropy measures do not 79 
depend on transition probability, which suits the current experiment given the design that 80 
interleaves choice and specified trial types.  81 
Tobia et al. (2012) puts forward in their fMRI study that entropy quantifies uncertainty, the 82 
inverse of predictive mechanisms used in higher cognitive processes. For example, they 83 
interpret positive correlations between past randomness neural activity as an increase of 84 
prediction error signals 43 and negative correlations as regions that monitor predictability of 85 
current events given past events 14,15. We expected to observe neural correlates of TE and SE in 86 
temporal and prefrontal regions in replication of a previous fMRI experiment using a similar 87 
multi-choice action selection task 11. Crucially, the high temporal resolution of MEG enabled 88 
us to test whether (1) entropy-related neural activity in sequential action selection occurs 89 
before or after the action; and (2) whether individual behavioural differences can be explained 90 
by monitoring of the preceding regularity in either trial type (TE) or subjects’ action choices 91 
(SE).  92 
 93 
RESULTS 94 
Behavioral results 95 
We recorded MEG data from 18 healthy young participants completing a multi-choice action 96 
selection task (Figure 1). Participants were instructed to press the button for a specific finger in 97 
‘Specified’ trials or were to make a new fresh choice of which button to press for ‘Choice’ 98 
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trials. On average, participants responded in 99.0±1.2% of action trials and the average total 99 
error rate was 3.2% for omission and commission errors. As expected 18, participants’ mean 100 
reaction times for choice trials was slightly longer than for specified trials (584ms±76ms and 101 
566ms±56ms respectively; two-tailed paired t-test t(17)=-2.10, p=.05). We assessed the effect 102 
of finger selection on reaction times using a repeated-measures ANOVA with two factors: 103 
finger selection (index to little finger) and task condition (specified or choice). There was no 104 
significant main effect of finger (F(1.87, 31.7)=3.32, p=.52), or task condition (F(1, 17)=4.45, 105 
p=.50), but there was a significant interaction between finger and task condition (F(2.07, 106 
35.2)=11.4, p<.001) such that, during choice trials, participants selected each finger with the 107 
following probabilities: index = 26.8%, middle = 28.7%, ring = 27.5%, little = 17%. Post-hoc 108 
tests demonstrated that the middle and little finger actions were significantly different from 109 
25% chance rate (Middle: Z=+2.85, p=.004; Little: Z=-3.72, p<.001, one-sample Wilcoxon 110 
signed-rank test). 111 
[Figure 1 about here] 112 
During choice trials, participants tended to choose a new action rather than repeat the previous 113 
action (repetition rate: 12.2±12.6%; Z=-3.28, p<.001, against chance rate of repetition at 25%, 114 
one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test). This inhibition of repetition was concordant with 115 
previous studies, and suggests that a current choice is modulated by the previous response 116 
history 18,44. The repetition rate was not significantly different across fingers (F(1.96, 117 
33.6)=0.28, p=.75) and the probability of finger choices were not different across repeated and 118 
non-repeated trials (χ2 (17)=1.67, p=.543, Friedman’s test). 119 
Trial and Selection entropy 120 
To observe the neural representation of regularity monitoring we measured the entropy of past 121 
trials events (Trial Entropy, TE) and of past finger choices (Selection entropy, SE) across 122 
temporally extended periods, we examined six windows of 25-50 trials, in steps of 5. These 123 
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window lengths were chosen to obtain meaningful measures of entropy and encompass those 124 
used in previous studies of statistical information representations in the brain for temporally 125 
extended event sequences 11,16,45. All participants showed fluctuations over time in their SE 126 
values. Their TE values also fluctuated over time because trial conditions were pseudo-127 
randomly intermixed. Figure 2a shows an example single participant’s TE and SE values for 128 
the shortest (25) and longest (50) sliding window lengths. The entropy measures for each 129 
window were non-independent, i.e. data from the 25-trial window and 30-trial window overlap 130 
in all but five trials. Thus, entropy measures were significantly correlated across time (Figure 131 
2b, Pearson’s r>0.55 and r>0.65 for TE and SE respectively, p<.003, Bonferroni corrected), 132 
where neighboring window lengths had highest coefficients. 133 
[Figure 2 about here] 134 
We tested whether entropy influenced reaction times using a within-participant Pearson’s 135 
correlation between single-trial reaction times and the corresponding trial and selection 136 
entropies. We used reaction times here as an indication of participant’s attention across the 137 
task, where we would expect slower reaction times with reduced concentration. We observed 138 
no significant correlations for any window lengths for either SE or TE (r<±0.018, p>.20 across 139 
all participants), suggesting that TE and SE measures were not significantly confounded by 140 
trial-to-trial variations in reaction time and therefore attention.  141 
There was a significant negative correlation between TE and SE for each window length (Z<-142 
2.67, p<.007, Figure 2c). There was not a significant main effect of window length on the TE-143 
SE correlations (χ2(5)=2.63, p=.76, Friedman’s test). Therefore, although SE was conditional 144 
on trial type, the recent specified trials order partially influenced the current trial choice. The 145 
strength of this relationship was observed to vary between individuals. For a window length of 146 
25, where the overall group correlation between TE and SE was z=-0.297, single participant 147 
correlations ranged from z=0.021 to z=-0.605. Some individuals therefore displayed a strong 148 
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negative correlation between TE and SE, while others demonstrated a weaker or no 149 
relationship (Figure 2d). No participants displayed a significant positive correlation. Hartigan’s 150 
dip test 46 over 10000 iterations confirmed that this represented a unimodal distribution suitable 151 
for further parametric analysis, rather than a bimodal distribution of strong and weak 152 
responders (dip=0.105, p=.079). 153 
Entropy related MEG responses 154 
Single trial gradiometer sensor MEG data were correlated with TE and SE measures using a 155 
first-level statistical parametric mapping (SPM) general linear model. For SE and TE 156 
separately, the resulting contrast images were used in a second-level SPM full-factorial model 157 
across all participants and all window lengths.  158 
For trial entropy, TE, there were significant negative correlations with the MEG responses 159 
(Figure 3a, p<.001 threshold with p<.05 FWE cluster correction). Crucially, these correlations 160 
began 30ms after the participants’ response and continued until the end of the epoch (1500ms). 161 
For MEG gradiometer sensors, the measurement at the scalp is maximal over the source of 162 
neural activity 47, which gives a fair approximation of the location of cortical sources in sensor 163 
space. The Figure 3B sensor space t-maps show these correlations were observed over the left 164 
frontal sensors throughout the post-response period, and additional right frontotemporal 165 
sensors later 656-1356ms period.  166 
To visualise the neural sources of these statistically significant sensor space correlations, we 167 
performed minimum norm source reconstruction of the single-trial MEG data around the time 168 
of peak effect within the significant sensor space clusters. We then correlated the resulting 169 
source space images with the trial entropy measures (Figure 3b right, p<.01). At 172ms, we 170 
observed correlations of trial entropy within the left inferior frontal gyrus (MNI: [-50, 10, 2], 171 
Neuromorphometrics Atlas, SPM12), and anterior middle frontal gyrus [-40, 46, 0]. Similar 172 
peak locations were observed for both 656ms and 1356ms time points in left anterior middle 173 
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frontal gyrus ([-36, 52, 2] and [-22, 58, 0] respectively), right superior temporal gyrus ([52, -174 
38, 10] and [54, -44, 12]) and left temporal pole ([-48, -2, -26] and [-50, 0, -28]).  175 
 We contrasted the short (25) and long (50) window lengths. Figure 3c shows significantly 176 
stronger negative correlations in bilateral frontotemporal sensor regions for longer trial 177 
windows. The left frontal sensors had negative correlations that peaked after the response at 178 
532ms, and were localised to the left anterior middle frontal gyrus [-40, 48, 2] and bilateral 179 
superior temporal gyrus ([-42, -8, -14] and [56, -10, -10]). The right frontal sensor negative 180 
correlations peaked later at 1112ms, and were localised to the right inferior temporal gyrus [52, 181 
-44, -26]. No correlations were greater for short vs. long windows. We observed no significant 182 
positive correlations between TE and the MEG response. 183 
[Figure 3 about here] 184 
For selection entropy, SE, we observed negative correlations both before the participants’ 185 
response at right and polar frontal sensors, and after the response at frontal polar sensors 186 
(Figure 4a and b), but these did not survive FWE cluster correction threshold. However, the 187 
use of such stringent whole-brain correction does not reflect our strong a-priori expectation for 188 
frontal lobe correlations with SE on the basis of previously published fMRI results 11. In Figure 189 
4 we therefore present results with the same height threshold but a more lenient 50-pixel 190 
cluster defining threshold. We again visualised the sources of these correlations using 191 
minimum norm source localisation (Figure 4b, p<.01). At -340ms, source peaks were observed 192 
in the right central operculum [58, -14, 16] and left inferior frontal gyrus [-54, 20, 18]. At t=-193 
16ms, source peaks were observed in right anterior middle frontal gyrus [22, 50, 14], bilateral 194 
anterior orbital gyrus ([-24, 44, -12] and [22, 52, -16]) and right superior temporal gyrus [58, -195 
2, -2]. At t=376ms source peaks were observed in the left anterior orbital gyrus [-24, 46, -12], 196 
right superior frontal gyrus [12, 62, 20], left inferior frontal gyrus [-38, 14, 24] and left 197 
temporal pole [-28, 12, -36]. 198 
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Given our a-priori hypothesis of the presence of negative correlations in the frontal pole from 199 
previous fMRI observation 11, we assessed the effect of window length within a 20mm box 200 
ROI in the frontal pole. The post-response signal in the frontal polar region was significant for 201 
the long > short contrast (p=.009, t=3.48, FWE peak correction, Figure 4c). Source localisation 202 
(Figure 4d), suggested that the strongest negative correlations were in the left inferior frontal 203 
gyrus [-36, 14, 24], left anterior orbital gyrus [-20, 58, -14] and right superior frontal gyrus [12, 204 
58, 22]. There were no significant differences for the reverse contrast or for positive 205 
correlations with MEG. 206 
[Figure 4 about here] 207 
Inter individual variability 208 
As expected from previous work, we observed that TE and SE were negatively correlated 11. 209 
The strength of this relationship differed between individuals (Figure 2d). In a post-hoc 210 
exploratory analysis, we explored the neural correlates of this difference. Figure 5 shows the 211 
between-participants relationship between the peak t-score of each entropy-related neural 212 
response (Figure 3a and 4a) and the correlations between TE and SE for the 25-event window 213 
(Figure 2d). We demonstrated a significant negative correlation for TE (Pearson’s r=-0.55, 214 
n=18, p=.018) but not for SE (Pearson’s r=0.22, n=18, p=.38). We compared these correlations 215 
using Meng’s z-test for comparing correlations 48. The TE and SE correlations were 216 
significantly different (z=2.31, p=.011). 217 
Shapiro-Wilk tests demonstrated that the use of parametric statistics to assess correlations 218 
between our measures of interest was not rendered inappropriate by deviations from the normal 219 
distribution in these variables: (TE peak t-score W=0.92, n=18, p=0.11; TE-SE correlation 220 
W=0.90, n=18, p=0.055). However, to ensure the robustness of this finding, the analyses were 221 
repeated using non-parametric Spearman’s rank correlations. The results were replicated, with 222 
a significant negative correlation again demonstrated for TE (Spearman’s rho=-0.56, n=18, 223 
p=0.018) but not for SE (Spearman’s rho=0.06, n=18, p=0.80). 224 
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Similarly, the results were robust to different choices in how the strength of neural response 225 
related to TE was quantified for each individual. We used a binary mask of group significance 226 
to restrict the time and location of the single subject analysis to those clusters demonstrated to 227 
have population-level relevance for TE and SE respectively. Repeating the analysis with a 228 
much more liberal mask, containing any pixel with p<0.001 correlation at the group level 229 
uncorrected for multiple comparisons and therefore resulting in more latitude for individual 230 
differences in the scalp location and time of peak response, had very little effect on the 231 
negative correlation demonstrated for TE (Pearson’s r=-0.54, n=18, p=0.021; Spearman’s 232 
rho=-0.54, n=18, p=0.023). The t-peak values were determined for each individual separately, 233 
not on the group t-maps, on the basis that it could not reasonably be expected that all 234 
individuals would display the exact time and scalp location of response. However, to assess the 235 
uniformity of response we repeated the analysis with a much more stringent mask restricted to 236 
the group peak ([X=47, Y=8, time =656ms, F(1,102)=29.74, p<0.001] +/- 1cm and +/- 50ms; 237 
marked with a star in Figure 3b) and took the median individual t-score within this mask as the 238 
dependent measure for each individual. This resulted in slightly weaker correlations (Pearson’s 239 
r=-0.45, n=18, p=0.061; Spearman’s rho=-0.53, n=18, p=0.026), but a similar pattern. 240 
Overall, therefore, individual differences in the strength of the relationship between past events 241 
and future choices could be accounted for by the strength of neural monitoring of past events 242 
(TE) but not by the strength of monitoring of past choices (SE).  243 
[Figure 5 about here] 244 
DISCUSSION 245 
When faced with a choice between similar alternative actions, our decisions are constrained by 246 
the history of recent experience and choices. These constraints vary over time, leading to slow 247 
fluctuations in the regularity of behavioral decisions. This study makes three key contributions. 248 
First, we replicate the finding that frontal and temporal neural responses relate to the regularity 249 
in the sequence of recent events (trial entropy). But, by exploiting the temporal resolution of 250 
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MEG, we demonstrated that these correlations occur after the response, suggesting the 251 
updating of a monitor of recent stimulus events, occurring after the new action is made. 252 
Second, we replicate the finding that rostral frontal activity correlated negatively with the 253 
entropy of participants’ own chosen actions (selection entropy), but here we demonstrated that 254 
the physiological response occurred both before and after the response. Third, the degree to 255 
which individuals manifested a link between the variability of the preceding experimental 256 
context and their current behavior was related to the strength of their neural correlates of trial 257 
entropy but not selection entropy. We interpret this as evidence that the constraints on current 258 
behavioral choices are driven more strongly by the degree of monitoring of recent events than 259 
by the instantiation of arbitrary rules. 260 
The prefrontal cortex facilitates optimal interactions with a dynamic environment 10,49,50. By 261 
virtue of its connectivity, this region is well placed to integrate sensory information from 262 
multiple domains, defining behavioral goals, maintaining the response sets necessary to 263 
achieve them, and predicting the outcomes of action 49,51. The value of a given course of action 264 
may be learned by subjects, either in association with specific stimuli or in terms of a current 265 
task set or rule 38. However, there are situations in which current stimuli do not in themselves 266 
provide the evidence necessary to make a choice. Whether the choice refers to the action itself, 267 
how to select it, when or whether to make it 52,53 the resolution of ambiguity is time consuming 268 
and effortful, with extensive activations observed for what might otherwise be seen as trivial or 269 
inconsequential choices 27. In neuroeconomic terms, there is a cost of ambiguity, to resolve a 270 
choice when the expected rewards are too similar between response options 54.  271 
One solution to the problem of ambiguity is stochastic decision-making, competing ‘first past 272 
the post’ between response options 11,44. An arguably simpler strategy is to assign differential 273 
value according to a local arbitrary rule, thereby replacing the ambiguity by a value based 274 
decision process 55, even without attributing stable or causal relationships between decision 275 
and outcome 56. The presence of an arbitrary ‘rule’ would also reduce the differential reaction 276 
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time between trial types, and support the observed attribution of value to freely chosen 277 
responses 57.  278 
As a result, a participant would have a-priori response preferences that determine the 279 
inequality in the distribution of ostensibly equivalent choices, despite the experimental 280 
neutrality over the response options. Such an arbitrary ‘rule’ would also reduce the differential 281 
reaction time between trial types. Rules and response-sets can be chosen 53, but more usually 282 
they are specified experimentally. Multiple studies show the prefrontal and frontopolar cortical 283 
representations of such rules 36,38,53 and the impact of prefrontal lesions on rule-guided or goal-284 
directed action. The specific rule need not be directly determined, and may change over time, 285 
but such rules would reduce the entropy of responses.  286 
We observed the neurophysiological correlate of selection entropy at right frontal sensors 287 
before the action was made. Source localisation of these correlations revealed peak responses 288 
in the right supramarginal gyrus at -340ms, and right frontopolar prefrontal cortex and left 289 
orbitofrontal cortex at -16ms. The prefrontal cortex is known to be active when learning or 290 
retrieving rules and when implementing or switching rules 37,44. We suggest that the application 291 
of a local rule, by prefrontal cortex, is embedded in the current sequence of trial types and 292 
choices, whether a simple rule (e.g. the avoidance of repetition) or a more complex statistical 293 
dependency between events. Premotor and supplementary motor areas may also show 294 
activation in respond to arbitrary rules and in volitional actions 22,58 but these areas were not 295 
observed for selection entropy correlations. We also observed activity related to selection 296 
entropy after the response in left orbitofrontal cortex and right frontopolar prefrontal cortex. 297 
We suggest this activity might be updating a monitor of past responses, although it could 298 
represent the reinforcement of the transient response set 36,38. The prefrontal cortical 299 
correlations with selection entropy increased with longer window lengths, which argues 300 
against a within-trial ‘surprise’ signal 11,59. Further studies could directly assess whether this 301 
activity is monitoring past responses by testing whether the activity predicts if the participant 302 
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switches or repeats the previous response on the next response. However, with only 12.2% 303 
probability of repetition in trials we did not have enough trials to do this. 304 
We consider the importance of these results in regards to the broader issue of a predictive brain 305 
that is sensitive to odd and unexpected events (e.g. the mismatch response 2,60), regularities in 306 
stimulus patterns and sequence learning 61 and here we show that such sensitivity also extends 307 
to regularity in action choices. Changes in neural responses to regularities in sensory sequences 308 
are shown to correlate with changes in different neurological and psychiatric disorders 62. 309 
Therefore, it is of importance to conduct further studies into whether monitoring regularity in 310 
action choices also change in different disorders. We interpreted our MEG negative 311 
correlations in terms of a monitor of statistical regularities in sensory and motor events. 312 
However, the representation of statistical regularities equates to forming beliefs, including 313 
implicitly the beliefs used to make predictions about sensory inputs in a hierarchical predictive 314 
model of our actions and the environment. Indeed, it has recently been shown that mechanisms 315 
for monitoring prior stimulus statistics are represented at the neural level in rodents 63, 316 
demonstrating that such processes have significant evolutionary relevance. 317 
The experimental modulation of trial entropy was analogous to earlier studies of audio-visual 318 
sequence entropy 12,64. Our negative MEG correlations were concordant with evidence for 319 
activation-entropy associations for auditory and visual sequences 15,65. The negative 320 
correlations between neural activity and trial entropy replicated those demonstrated by Zhang 321 
and Rowe (2015). However, their fMRI study could not establish whether the activity occurred 322 
before or after the response. Here we demonstrate that neural activations related to trial entropy 323 
were limited to the post-response period and therefore represent the monitoring of recent 324 
events rather than an action selection process. 325 
In contrast to previous studies that used either short fixed event lengths or entire sequences 326 
14,16,59,66, we varied windows lengths from 25 to 50 trials, in line with the neural representations 327 
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of information theoretic measures such as entropy 11,15,66. This length is in keeping with the 328 
predictive value of events on remote future choices observed in non-human primate decisions 329 
67. We observed increased negative correlations between prefrontal regions and trial and 330 
selection entropy for the longer trial windows, suggesting that stronger frontal activity supports 331 
the updating or consolidation of response sets over multiple trials.  332 
Additionally, in a post-hoc analysis we observed an interaction between monitoring of events 333 
and the selection of action. For some individuals, periods of irregular events (high trial 334 
entropy) were associated with more regularity of action selection (low selection entropy). This 335 
behavioural interaction was significantly related to individual differences in the strength of 336 
activity related to monitoring recent trials (Figure 5). This provided a neurophysiological 337 
marker of individual differences in the degree to which recent behaviors and stimuli constrain 338 
subsequent voluntary actions. The importance of frontal brain regions for monitoring volitional 339 
decisions and influencing future decisions is clear from the behavioural consequences of 340 
damage or degeneration of the regions we identify in association with action selection. These 341 
may impair the self-initiation of actions, as a feature of apathy 68, reduce a sense of agency for 342 
one’s own actions 24, or lead to perseverative and stereotyped behaviours.  343 
The implication of the negative relationship between TE and SE is that the more entropic 344 
previous events have been, the less entropic an individual’s arbitrary choices tend to be. This 345 
can be seen as an analogous observation to inhibition of return in saccadic choices. Therefore, 346 
if the constrained trials are already highly entropic, it is not necessary to introduce entropy in 347 
one’s selections to avoid returning time and again to the same arbitrary choice. If a goal of the 348 
nervous system in arbitrary choices is to diversely sample selections to gain information about 349 
the relative merit of seemingly equivalent choices and thus constrain future choices in the 350 
optimal manner 69,70, it is more informative in determining the optimal choice at any one 351 
instant, to use the fidelity with which one has monitored previous sampling not previous 352 
unconstrained choices. This view is supported by our observation that individual differences in 353 
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the strength of the relationship between past events and future choices could be accounted for 354 
by the strength of neural monitoring of past events (TE) but not by the strength of monitoring 355 
of past choices (SE).  356 
There are potential limitations this study. First, participant’s attention may have varied across 357 
the length of the task. We tested correlations between reaction times and selection entropy, 358 
hypothesising that reaction times increase with reduced attention: there was not a significant 359 
correlation. Second, we analyzed the differences between trial window lengths using a full 360 
factorial model and corrected for non-sphericity because of the high correlations between 361 
regressors of the different window lengths that were nested within sequence. An alternative 362 
approach could use a separate regression model for each window length, followed by a 363 
disjunction test to estimate the temporal specific MEG activation associations. Both methods 364 
were used by Zhang and Rowe (2015), with similar results. However, the disjunction test 365 
would only show regions that correlate in one trial window and not the other, rather than 366 
directly testing the hypothesis that window length is itself a determinant of neural activity. 367 
Third, the selection entropy correlations were only observed using a more lenient whole-head 368 
statistical correction than trial entropy correlations. However, the location of selection entropy 369 
correlates were in agreement with anatomical priors based on the fMRI study of this task 11 and 370 
analogous correlates of regularity in other tasks 15,16. Fourth, our study was designed and 371 
powered to examine main effects of the association between activity and TE/SE but we 372 
acknowledge that power was limited for our post-hoc assessment of the neural correlations 373 
with individual differences: we were powered to detect large effects (similar studies using 374 
fMRI range from 12-16 participants 11,15,16,45). Despite this, we have demonstrated a robust 375 
statistical relationship between the degree to which individuals avoid repetition in their 376 
selected actions and the strength with which they neurally monitor the entropy of past events 377 
(trial entropy, Figure 5a). We did not demonstrate a relationship between individuals’ actions 378 
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and the strength with which they monitored their previous choices (selection entropy, Figure 379 
5b).  380 
In conclusion, we propose that when choosing between alternative response options, healthy 381 
adults make their decision in part based on a monitor of past events. Statistical regularities in 382 
the preceding actions are updated over successive trials, represented in prefrontal areas, and 383 
thereby influence subsequent choices between otherwise equivalent responses. We suggest this 384 
strategy reduces cognitive effort, and obviates a pause of ongoing behavior during decision-385 
making under uncertainty 42. We show that individual differences in sequential decisions relate 386 
to the strength of prefrontal monitoring of regularities in previous actions more than to the 387 
neural effort associated with the instantiation of such rules. Damage to these monitoring and 388 
selection processes may contribute to the stereotypies, inflexible predictions or chaotic 389 
behavioral patterns arising from frontal-lobe neurological disorders 71–74.  390 




Participants, data collection and preprocessing 393 
Twenty healthy, right-handed adults participated in the study (10 females, mean age 26.0 ± 4.9 394 
years, range 18-37). Two participants were excluded from further analysis due to error rates 395 
greater than three standard deviations from the group mean. Participants gave informed written 396 
consent. The study was approved by the Cambridge 2 Research Ethics Committee and the 397 
methods were carried out in accordance with the relevant guidelines and regulations. 398 
Participants had no history of psychiatric or neurological illness, and no previous experience of 399 
the task. 400 
Task 401 
We measured statistical regularities over temporally extended stimulus and action sequences 402 
using a multi-choice action selection task that allows participants to choose between action 403 
responses without explicit or learned rewards or feedback. The task has been used to study 404 
action decisions in healthy individuals 11, in ageing 75, and in Parkinson’s disease 71, with 405 
robust patterns of activation at group- and single-subject levels 27. In brief, participants 406 
watched an image of a hand with empty circles above the fingers. In `specified' trials, a single 407 
circle was filled, cueing the participant to press the corresponding finger on a manual button 408 
box. In `chosen' trials all four circles were filled, directing the participant to make a choice to 409 
press any one of their four fingers (Figure 1a). Participants were asked to make a “fresh 410 
choice, regardless of what they had done before”, as quickly as possible. There were no reward 411 
differences between action choices, no feedback, and no suggestion of rules for particular 412 
modes of response (such as to be ‘random’). Null trials appeared identical to a prolonged inter-413 
stimulus interval, with no response required of participants (to keep the paradigm identical to 414 
that used in previous fMRI studies, in which the null trials facilitate modelling). Stimuli were 415 
displayed for 1 second with 2.5 second stimulus onset asynchrony. The task contained 320 416 
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specified trials, 320 choice trials and 320 null events, were pseudo-randomly intermixed. The 417 
trials were split into four ten-minute blocks with short breaks (30s) for the participant to rest. 418 
The task was presented using E-Prime® software (Psychology Software Tools Inc.).  419 
MEG data acquisition and processing 420 
MEG data were collected using a magnetically shielded 306-channel Vectorview system 421 
(Elekta Neuromag), with a magnetometer and two orthogonal planar gradiometers at each of 422 
the 102 sensor positions. Vertical and horizontal eye movements were recorded using paired 423 
EOG electrodes, and the head position was monitored using five head-position indicator coils. 424 
A 3D digitizer (Fastrak; Polhemus) was used to record the three-dimensional locations of the 425 
coils, three anatomical fiducials (nasion and left and right preauricular points) and 426 
approximately 100 scalp points. We used Maxfilter software to make adjustments for head 427 
movement 76, and to downsample the data from 1kHz to 250Hz.  428 
The remaining pre-processing steps were completed using SPM12 software (Wellcome 429 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK). We high-pass filtered at 0.1 Hz and low-430 
pass filtered at 40 Hz using Butterworth filters. We epoched the data around the participant’s 431 
action response from -1500ms to 1500ms. We applied a baseline correction from -1500 to -432 
1000ms to ensure a baseline before the cue presentation. We used baseline correction because 433 
of our interest of how the evoked response is modulated by context of SE and TE, rather than 434 
the mean effect of these entropy measures over time. We applied automatic trial artefact 435 
rejection by thresholding the EOG electrodes at 200µV. Omission and commission error trials 436 
were rejected, as were trials on which the participant’s reaction time was less than 150ms or 437 
longer than 1500ms.  438 
Sliding window entropy measures of randomness 439 
To investigate neural monitoring of temporal events, we calculated the entropy measures of 440 
previous trials and of previous action selection events, replicating Zhang and Rowe (2015). We 441 
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correlated these entropy measures with single-trial MEG responses. We calculated the entropy 442 
over a sliding window of previous stimuli (Cj={a, b, c, d, e}, Figure 1b) or previous choice 443 
selection responses (Aj={1, 2, 3, 4}, for each finger). Iterating through each trial i, the window 444 
included the range of trials: [i-n+1, i], where n was the length of the window (Figure 1c). The 445 
entropy measure was then assigned to the ith trial and correlated with that trial’s MEG 446 
response. Though error trials were excluded from imaging statistics, they were included in the 447 
measurement of trial entropy (TE) to obtain the complete measure of stimulus trial variability. 448 
Choice trial omission errors were not included in the calculation of selection entropy (SE). The 449 
entropy values were calculated for six trial windows (n=25-50 trails, step size =5), to examine 450 
whether any brain regions were sensitive to the fluctuations of entropy over different 451 
timescales 11.  452 
TE was defined by Shannon’s entropy. TE quantitatively measures the degree of randomness 453 
in the presented stimuli within the sliding window. Higher TE values indicated higher 454 
randomness within the window. The TE at the ith trial is given by: 455 
ܶܧ(݅) = ܪ(ܵݐ݅݉ݑ݈݅) = −∑ ݌൫ܥ௝ = ݇൯ log ݌൫ܥ௝ = ݇൯௞ୀ(௔,௕,௖,ௗ,௘) , (݅ − ݊ + 1 ≤ ݆ ≤ ݅)    (1) 456 
SE was measured from the degree of randomness in participants’ responses in the choice trials. 457 
SE was defined by conditional entropy 15, calculating the probability of each action given the 458 
stimuli was a choice trial. The SE at the ith trial is given by: 459 
ܵܧ(݅) = ܪ(ܣܿݐ݅݋݊ݏ|ܵݐ݅݉ݑ݈݅ = ሼ݁ሽ)




TE and SE values were not calculated for the trials occurring before the end of the first sliding 460 
window of interest because there were not enough trials to calculate the entropy measure. Both 461 
TE and SE were calculated for every following trial, whether specified or choice, because we 462 
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assumed each measure to be a sustained state representation of the degree of order based on 463 
recent trials 11.  464 
Entropy-related MEG responses  465 
For each participant, their trial-by-trial TE and SE measures were mean centred and used as 466 
regressors within a first-level general linear model to correlate with the single-trial planar-467 
gradiometer MEG data. We firstly completed our analyses in MEG sensor space to be able to 468 
observe the correlations across all space and all time. This analysis was repeated for each 469 
sliding window. For both TE and SE, we included the first-level contrast images across all six 470 
windows within a second-level full-factorial model to examine neural correlations of entropy 471 
for all trial window lengths and to contrast these correlations across window lengths. The data 472 
were adjusted for unequal variance and for non-sphericity with dependence between measures. 473 
Note that a repeated measures design was not appropriate for the multiple window lengths, as 474 
the measures reflected nested sequences and were not independent repeated samples. We 475 
analyzed trials locked to the participants’ responses to investigate temporal precedence of these 476 
neural correlations in relation to the action response. 477 
Source Localisation of Entropy correlations 478 
Additionally, we performed single-trial MEG source localisation to make inferences of the 479 
neural sources that correlated with the measures of entropy. Firstly, we estimated the forward 480 
leadfield model using the participant’s individual structural MRI scan to construct a realistic 481 
single-shell head model, normalised to MNI standard space (MRI: 3T Siemens Tim Trio, T1-482 
weighted 3D MPRAGE sequence, TR =2250 ms, TE =2.99 ms, flip angle 9°, field-of-view 483 
240x256x160, 1 mm slice thickness). The head model was co-registered to digitised 484 
anatomical fiducial markers and scalp points. We computed the inverse source reconstruction 485 
for every trial using the minimum norm algorithm 77 for 20ms time windows around the time 486 
of peak significance for each of the significant clusters observed in the sensor space analysis. 487 
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The resulting single-trail source reconstructed images were smoothed using an 8 mm FWHM 488 
Gaussian kernel and then correlated with the trial and selection entropy values, replicating the 489 
statistical analysis steps used in the sensor space correlations. As the goal of the 490 
reconstructions was to visualise the location of the neural sources already statistically 491 
demonstrated in sensor space, correlation maps were displayed at a voxelwise threshold of 492 
p<.01. 493 
Inter individual variability 494 
TE and SE are negatively correlated 11. We observed that the strength of this relationship 495 
differs between individuals (Figure 2d). To assess whether this coupling between TE and SE 496 
related to the strength of entropy-related neural activity, we undertook a further three step post-497 
hoc analysis. First, we separately extracted binary masks of the scalp topology of neural 498 
activity related to TE and SE from the general linear model described above (Figure 3a and 499 
4a). Second, using these masks as a region of interest, for each individual we separately 500 
extracted the peak t-score between neural coupling and both TE and SE, reflecting the strength 501 
of the neural response associated with these measures. T-scores are a more appropriate 502 
measure here than beta estimates, as they are less vulnerable to differences in noise between 503 
scalp locations at the single pixel level 78, and in overall response amplitude between brain 504 
areas 79. Finally, we correlated these extracted values, which represented the individual 505 
strengths of coupling between neural activity and either TE or SE, with subjects’ behavior 506 
calculated as follows: to account for the possibility of a delayed relationship between TE and 507 
SE, for each individual we aligned the TE and SE signals by maximising the normalized cross 508 
correlation within a lag window of ±10 trials. At this optimal lag, we then calculated the 509 
Pearson’s product moment correlation co-efficient between TE and SE at the window length of 510 
25 trials. This window length was chosen because, as shown in Figure 2c, the absolute value of 511 
the TE-SE correlation was relatively unaffected by increasing window length but the 512 
variability of the measure increased. As can be appreciated from Figure 2a and 2b, at longer 513 
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window lengths much of the trial-to-trial variability in TE and SE is reduced by temporal 514 
smoothing. A short window length therefore allows the most robust measure of TE-SE 515 
correlation. These data were then Fisher Z-transformed for correlation with the measure of 516 
neural activity. 517 
Data availability 518 
The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author 519 




1. Näätänen, R., Gaillard, A. W. & Mäntysalo, S. Early selective-attention effect on evoked 522 
potential reinterpreted. Acta Psychol. (Amst). 42, 313–329 (1978). 523 
2. Phillips, H. N., Blenkmann, A., Hughes, L., Bekinschtein, T. A. & Rowe, J. B. Hierarchical 524 
Organization of Frontotemporal Networks for the Prediction of Stimuli across Multiple 525 
Dimensions. J. Neurosci. 35, 9255–9264 (2015). 526 
3. Ewbank, M. P. et al. Changes in ‘Top-Down’ Connectivity Underlie Repetition Suppression in 527 
the Ventral Visual Pathway. J. Neurosci. 31, 5635–5642 (2011). 528 
4. Cope, T. E. et al. Artificial grammar learning in vascular and progressive non-fluent aphasias. 529 
Neuropsychologia 104, 201–213 (2017). 530 
5. Saffran, J. R., Johnson, E. K., Aslin, R. N. & Newport, E. L. Statistical learning of tone 531 
sequences by human infants and adults. Cognition 70, 27–52 (1999). 532 
6. Friston, K. J., Daunizeau, J., Kilner, J. M. & Kiebel, S. J. Action and behavior: a free-energy 533 
formulation. Biol. Cybern. 102, 227–60 (2010). 534 
7. Kiebel, S. J., Daunizeau, J. & Friston, K. J. A hierarchy of time-scales and the brain. PLoS 535 
Comput. Biol. 4, e1000209 (2008). 536 
8. Grahn, J. A. & Rowe, J. B. Feeling the beat: premotor and striatal interactions in musicians and 537 
nonmusicians during beat perception. J. Neurosci. 29, 7540–8 (2009). 538 
9. Cope, T. E., Grube, M., Singh, B., Burn, D. J. & Griffiths, T. D. The basal ganglia in perceptual 539 
timing: Timing performance in Multiple System Atrophy and Huntington’s disease. 540 
Neuropsychologia 52, 73–81 (2014). 541 
10. Barascud, N., Pearce, M., Griffiths, T., Friston, K. J. & Chait, M. MEG responses in humans 542 
reveal ideal-observer-like sensitivity to complex acoustic patterns. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 113, 543 
E616–E625 (2016). 544 
11. Zhang, J. & Rowe, J. B. The neural signature of information regularity in temporally extended 545 
event sequences. Neuroimage 107, 266–276 (2015). 546 
12. Huettel, S. A., Mack, P. B. & McCarthy, G. Perceiving patterns in random series: dynamic 547 
processing of sequence in prefrontal cortex. Nat. Neurosci. 5, 485–490 (2002). 548 
 24 
 
13. Friston, K. J., Kilner, J. M. & Harrison, L. M. A free energy principle for the brain. J. Physiol. 549 
100, 70–87 (2006). 550 
14. Bischoff-Grethe, A., Martin, M., Mao, H. & Berns, G. S. The context of uncertainty modulates 551 
the subcortical response to predictability. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 13, 986–93 (2001). 552 
15. Tobia, M. J., Iacovella, V. & Hasson, U. Multiple sensitivity profiles to diversity and transition 553 
structure in non-stationary input. Neuroimage 60, 1–59 (2012). 554 
16. Strange, B. A., Duggins, A., Penny, W., Dolan, R. J. & Friston, K. J. Information theory, novelty 555 
and hippocampal responses: unpredicted or unpredictable? Neural Networks 18, 225–230 556 
(2005). 557 
17. Mars, R. B. et al. Trial-by-trial fluctuations in the event-related electroencephalogram reflect 558 
dynamic changes in the degree of surprise. J. Neurosci. 28, 12539–12545 (2008). 559 
18. Zhang, J., Hughes, L. & Rowe, J. B. Selection and inhibition mechanisms for human voluntary 560 
action decisions. Neuroimage 63, 392–402 (2012). 561 
19. Rowe, J. B. & Wolpe, N. in The Sense of Agency (eds. Haggard, P. & Eitam, B.) 389–414 562 
(2015). 563 
20. Haggard, P. Human volition: towards a neuroscience of will. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 9, 934–46 564 
(2008). 565 
21. Frith, C. D., Friston, K. J., Liddle, P. F. & Frackowiak, R. S. J. Willed Action and the Prefrontal 566 
Cortex in Man: A Study with PET. Proc. R. Soc. London. Ser. B Biol. Sci. 244, 241–246 (1991). 567 
22. Lau, H. C., Rogers, R. D., Ramnani, N. & Passingham, R. E. Willed action and attention to the 568 
selection of action. Neuroimage 21, 1407–15 (2004). 569 
23. Forstmann, B. U. et al. When the choice is ours: Context and agency modulate the neural bases 570 
of decision-making. PLoS One 3, 2–7 (2008). 571 
24. Haggard, P. Sense of agency in the human brain. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 18, 197–208 (2017). 572 
25. Shadlen, M. N. & Newsome, W. Neural basis of a perceptual decision in the parietal cortex (area 573 
LIP) of the rhesus monkey. J. Neurophysiol. 86, 1916–1936 (2001). 574 
26. Roitman, J. D. & Shadlen, M. N. Response of neurons in the lateral intraparietal area during a 575 
combined visual discrimination reaction time task. J. Neurosci. 22, 9475–89 (2002). 576 
27. Rae, C. L., Hughes, L., Weaver, C., Anderson, M. C. & Rowe, J. B. Selection and stopping in 577 
 25 
 
voluntary action: A meta-analysis and combined fMRI study. Neuroimage 86, 381–91 (2014). 578 
28. Hoffstaedter, F., Grefkes, C., Zilles, K. & Eickhoff, S. B. The ‘“What”’ and ‘“When”’ of Self-579 
Initiated Movements. Cereb. Cortex 23, 520–530 (2013). 580 
29. Forstmann, B. U. et al. Function and structure of the right inferior frontal cortex predict 581 
individual differences in response inhibition: a model-based approach. J. Neurosci. 28, 9790–6 582 
(2008). 583 
30. Cunnington, R., Windischberger, C., Robinson, S. & Moser, E. The selection of intended actions 584 
and the observation of others’ actions: a time-resolved fMRI study. Neuroimage 29, 1294–302 585 
(2006). 586 
31. Kranick, S. M. & Hallett, M. Neurology of volition. Exp Brain Res 229, 313–327 (2013). 587 
32. Rowe, J. B. et al. Parkinson’s disease and dopaminergic therapy--differential effects on 588 
movement, reward and cognition. Brain 131, 2094–105 (2008). 589 
33. Moretto, G., Schwingenschuh, P., Katschnig, P., Bhatia, K. & Haggard, P. Delayed experience 590 
of volition in Gilles de la Tourette syndrome. J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry 82, 1324–1327 591 
(2011). 592 
34. Snowden, J. S., Neary, D. & Mann, D. M. A. Frontotemporal dementia. Br. J. Psychiatry 180, 593 
140–143 (2002). 594 
35. Baddeley, A. D. Random Generation and the Executive Control of Working Memory. Q. J. Sect. 595 
A 51A, 819–852 (1998). 596 
36. Sakai, K. & Passingham, R. E. Prefrontal interactions reflect future task operations. Nat. 597 
Neurosci. 6, 75–81 (2003). 598 
37. Bunge, S. A. How we use rules to select actions: A review of evidence from cognitive 599 
neuroscience. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 4, 564–579 (2004). 600 
38. Sakai, K. & Passingham, R. E. Prefrontal Set Activity Predicts Rule-Specific Neural Processing 601 
during Subsequent Cognitive Performance. J. Neurosci. 26, 1211–1218 (2006). 602 
39. Ridderinkhof, K. R., Span, M. M. & van der Molen, M. W. Perseverative Behavior and 603 
Adaptive Control in Older Adults: Performance Monitoring, Rule Induction, and Set Shifting. 604 
Brain Cogn. 49, 382–401 (2002). 605 
40. Posner, M. I., Rafal, R. D., Choate, L. S. & Vaughan, J. Inhibition of return: Neural basis and 606 
 26 
 
function. Cogn. Neuropsychol. 2, 211–228 (1984). 607 
41. Farrell, S., Ludwig, C. J. H., Ellis, L. A. & Gilchrist, I. D. Influence of environmental statistics 608 
on inhibition of saccadic return. PNAS 107, 929–934 (2010). 609 
42. Frank, M., Samanta, J., AA Moustafa, A. & SJ Sherman, S. Hold Your Horses: Impulsivity, 610 
Deep Brain Stimulation, and Medication in Parkinsonism. Science (80-. ). 318, 1309–1312 611 
(2007). 612 
43. Rao, R. P. N. & Ballard, D. H. Predictive coding in the visual cortex: a functional interpretation 613 
of some extra-classical receptive-field effects. Nat. Neurosci. 2, 79–87 (1999). 614 
44. Rowe, J. B., Hughes, L. & Nimmo-Smith, I. Action selection: a race model for selected and non-615 
selected actions distinguishes the contribution of premotor and prefrontal areas. Neuroimage 51, 616 
888–96 (2010). 617 
45. Harrison, L. M., Duggins, A. & Friston, K. J. Encoding uncertainty in the hippocampus. Neural 618 
Networks 19, 535–546 (2006). 619 
46. Hartigan, J. A. & Hartigan, P. M. The Dip Test of Unimodality. Ann. Stat. 13, 70–84 (1985). 620 
47. Parkkonen, L. in MEG: An Introduction to Methods (eds. Hansen, P., Kringelbach, M. & 621 
Salmelin, R.) 24–64 (Oxford University Press., 2010). 622 
48. Meng, X.-L., Rosenthal, R. & Rubin, D. B. Comparing correlated correlation coefficients. 623 
Psychol. Bull. 111, 172–175 (1992). 624 
49. Passingham, R. E. & Wise, S. P. The Neurobiology of the Prefrontal Cortex: Anatomy, 625 
Evolution and the Origin of Insight. (Oxford University Press, 2012). 626 
50. Behrens, T. E. J., Woolrich, M. W., Walton, M. E. & Rushworth, M. F. S. Learning the value of 627 
information in an uncertain world. Nat. Neurosci. 10, 1214–21 (2007). 628 
51. Rushworth, M. F. S., Kolling, N., Sallet, J. & Mars, R. B. Valuation and decision-making in 629 
frontal cortex: one or many serial or parallel systems? Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 22, 946–55 630 
(2012). 631 
52. Brass, M. & Haggard, P. To do or not to do: the neural signature of self-control. J. Neurosci. 27, 632 
9141–5 (2007). 633 
53. Zhang, J., Kriegeskorte, N., Carlin, J. D. & Rowe, J. B. Choosing the rules: distinct and 634 
overlapping frontoparietal representations of task rules for perceptual decisions. J. Neurosci. 33, 635 
 27 
 
11852–62 (2013). 636 
54. Glimcher, P. W., Camerer, C. F., Fehr, E. & Poldrack, R. A. Neuroeconomics. Annu. Rev. 637 
Psychol. (Elsevier Inc., 2014). 638 
55. Daw, N. D., O’Doherty, J. P., Dayan, P., Seymour, B. & Dolan, R. J. Cortical substrates for 639 
exploratory decisions in humans. Nature 441, 876–9 (2006). 640 
56. Jocham, G. et al. Reward-Guided Learning with and without Causal Attribution. Neuron 90, 641 
177–190 (2016). 642 
57. Cockburn, J., Collins, A. G. E. & Frank, M. J. A Reinforcement Learning Mechanism 643 
Responsible for the Valuation of Free Choice. Neuron 83, 551–557 (2014). 644 
58. Fried, I., Mukamel, R. & Kreiman, G. Internally generated preactivation of single neurons in 645 
human medial frontal cortex predicts volition. Neuron 69, 548–62 (2011). 646 
59. Bestmann, S. et al. Influence of Uncertainty and Surprise on Human Corticospinal Excitability 647 
during Preparation for Action. Curr. Biol. 18, 775–780 (2008). 648 
60. Friston, K. J. A theory of cortical responses. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B. Biol. Sci. 360, 815–649 
36 (2005). 650 
61. Wacongne, C., Changeux, J.-P. & Dehaene, S. A neuronal model of predictive coding 651 
accounting for the mismatch negativity. J. Neurosci. 32, 3665–78 (2012). 652 
62. Näätänen, R. et al. The mismatch negativity (MMN)--a unique window to disturbed central 653 
auditory processing in ageing and different clinical conditions. Clin. Neurophysiol. 123, 424–58 654 
(2012). 655 
63. Akrami, A., Kopec, C. D., Diamond, M. E. & Brody, C. D. Posterior parietal cortex represents 656 
sensory history and mediates its effects on behaviour. Nature 554, 368–372 (2018). 657 
64. Nobre, A. C., Coull, J. T., Frith, C. D. & Mesulam, M. M. Orbitofrontal cortex is activated 658 
during breaches of expectation in tasks of visual attention. Nat. Neurosci. 2, 11–12 (1999). 659 
65. Nastase, S., Iacovella, V. & Hasson, U. Uncertainty in visual and auditory series is coded by 660 
modality-general and modality-specific neural systems. Hum. Brain Mapp. 35, 1111–1128 661 
(2014). 662 
66. Harrison, L. M., Bestmann, S., Rosa, M. J., Penny, W. D. & Green, G. G. R. Time scales of 663 
representation in the human brain: weighing past information to predict future events. Front. 664 
 28 
 
Hum. Neurosci. 5, 37 (2011). 665 
67. Churchland, A. K., Kiani, R. & Shadlen, M. N. Decision-making with multiple alternatives. Nat. 666 
Neurosci. 11, 693–702 (2008). 667 
68. Levy, R. & Dubois, B. Apathy and the Functional Anatomy of the Prefrontal Cortex-Basal 668 
Ganglia Circuits. Cereb. Cortex 16, 916–928 (2005). 669 
69. Information sampling and adaptive cognition. (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 670 
70. Hsu, M., Bhatt, M., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D. & Camerer, C. F. Neural Systems Responding to 671 
Degrees of Uncertainty in Human Decision-Making. Science (80-. ). 310, 1689–1683 (2005). 672 
71. Hughes, L., Altena, E., Barker, R. A. & Rowe, J. B. Perseveration and Choice in Parkinson’s 673 
Disease: The Impact of Progressive Frontostriatal Dysfunction on Action Decisions. Cereb. 674 
cortex 1–10 (2012). doi:10.1093/cercor/bhs144 675 
72. Kayser, A. S. & D’Esposito, M. Abstract rule learning: The differential effects of lesions in 676 
frontal cortex. Cereb. Cortex 23, 230–240 (2013). 677 
73. Gleichgerrcht, E., Ibanez, A., Roca, M., Torralva, T. & Manes, F. Decision-making cognition in 678 
neurodegenerative diseases. Nat Rev Neurol 6, 611–623 (2010). 679 
74. Cope, T. E. et al. Evidence for causal top-down frontal contributions to predictive processes in 680 
speech perception. Nat. Commun. 681 
75. Rowe, J. B. et al. The val158met COMT polymorphism’s effect on atrophy in healthy aging and 682 
Parkinson’s disease. Neurobiol. Aging 31, 1064–8 (2010). 683 
76. Taulu, S., Simola, J. & Kajola, M. Applications of the signal space separation method. Signal 684 
Process. IEEE 53, 3359–3372 (2005). 685 
77. Hauk, O. Keep it simple: a case for using classical minimum norm estimation in the analysis of 686 
EEG and MEG data. Neuroimage 21, 1612–1621 (2004). 687 
78. Misaki, M., Kim, Y., Bandettini, P. A. & Kriegeskorte, N. Comparison of multivariate classifiers 688 
and response normalizations for pattern-information fMRI. Neuroimage 53, 103–118 (2010). 689 
79. Smith, A. T., Kosillo, P. & Williams, A. L. The confounding effect of response amplitude on 690 





J.B.R and H.N.P. were supported by the James S. McDonnell Foundation 21st Century Science 694 
Initiative, Scholar Award in Understanding Human Cognition. J.B.R. and L.E.H were 695 
supported by Wellcome Trust [Senior Fellowship to JBR; 103838]. J.Z. was supported by the 696 
Medical Research Council [MC-A060-5PQ30]. T.E.C was supported by The Patrick Berthoud 697 
Charitable Trust and the Association of British Neurologists. 698 
Author contributions 699 
H.P. contributed acquisition, analysis and interpretation of the data and writing of this 700 
manuscript. T.E.C. contributed analysis and interpretation of the data and writing of this 701 
manuscript. L.E.H. contributed design of the paradigm and the acquisition of data. J.Z. 702 
contributed analysis and interpretation of the data. J.B.R. contributed design of this study and 703 
paradigm, interpretation of the data and writing of this manuscript. 704 
We have no competing interests 705 
  706 
 30 
 
Figure Legends 707 
Figure 1. The four-choice action selection experiment design. a) An example trial sequence 708 
with specified (one circle filled), choice (four circles filled) and null trials (no circles filled). 709 
The image of the hand with unfilled circles remains on screen between trials for 1.5 seconds. 710 
Each stimulus trial is presented for 1 second, with 2.5 second stimulus onset asynchrony. b) 711 
The experimental stimuli used in the action selection task. Trials (a)-(d) are the specified trial 712 
cues where the participant was cued to press the specified finger. Trial (e) is the choice trial 713 
cue where the participant was cued to make an action with a finger of their choice. c) We show 714 
an example of a trial window incrementally sliding over trial stimuli (a-e in B) to calculate the 715 
entropy of stimuli or actions preceding the current trial. The trial entropy (TE) and selection 716 
entropy (SE) values were assigned to the last trial within the window as the arrows show. 717 
Figure adapted with permission from 11. 718 
Figure 2. Entropy measures. a) Trial entropy (TE, left) and selection entropy (SE, right) for a 719 
single participant. The blue lines are entropy measures using the 25-trial sliding-window and 720 
the red lines are the 50-trial entropy measures. b) Correlation of the different sliding windows 721 
for TE (left) and SE (right), averaged across all participants. All correlations were significant 722 
(p<.003, even with conservative Bonferroni correction, noting that the entropy measures are 723 
not independent tests between sliding windows of different length). c) The mean Fisher 724 
transformed correlations between TE and SE with standard error bars. Each correlation was 725 
significant. d) A histogram showing frequency of TE-SE correlation across participants for the 726 
25-trial window. Some individuals displayed a strong negative correlation between TE and SE, 727 
while others demonstrated a weaker or no relationship. 728 
Figure 3. Trial entropy correlations with MEG. a) The significant negative correlations 729 
between TE and planar gradiometer data, averaged across all TE windows in sensor-time space 730 
(voxel threshold: p<.001, t>3.17 with FWE cluster thresholded at p<.05). The scalp plot shows 731 
 31 
 
the sensor space clusters collapsed across time and the figure above shows the x plane of 732 
sensor space against time. Note that all significant correlations were observed after the 733 
response time at t=0ms. b) The t-maps (left) show those scalp locations at which negative 734 
correlations were above threshold at the peak time point of each cluster. The location of peak 735 
overall group response across the whole of scalp-time space is indicated by a red star. We 736 
visualised the location of the neural sources (right) within a 20ms time window around each of 737 
these time-points (p<.01, t>2.36). At t=172ms, source peaks were observed in the left inferior 738 
frontal gyrus, and anterior middle frontal gyrus (Neuromorphometrics atlas). Similar peak 739 
locations were observed for t=656ms and t=1356ms in left anterior middle frontal gyrus, right 740 
superior temporal gyrus and left temporal pole. c) Clusters in sensor-time space with 741 
significantly greater negative correlations for longer trial windows (thresholding as panel a). d) 742 
The t-maps (left) show the scalp location of the significant differences between window 743 
lengths at the peak time point for each cluster. For the t=532ms peak, the sources were 744 
localised to the left anterior middle frontal gyrus and bilateral superior temporal gyrus 745 
(thresholding as panel b). For the t=1112ms peak, the largest cluster was localised to the right 746 
inferior temporal gyrus.  747 
Figure 4. Selection entropy correlations with MEG. a) The significant negative correlations 748 
between SE and planar gradiometer data, averaged across all SE windows in sensor-time space 749 
(voxel threshold: p<.001, t>3.17 with 50 voxel cluster thresholding11). Negative correlations 750 
were observed both before and after the response at t=0ms. B) The t-maps (left) show the scalp 751 
location of the significant correlations at the peak time point of each cluster. We visualised the 752 
location of the neural sources (right) within a 20ms time window around each of these time-753 
points (p<.01, t>2.36). At t=-340ms, source peaks were observed in the right central operculum 754 
and left inferior frontal gyrus. At t=-16ms, source peaks were observed in right anterior middle 755 
frontal gyrus, left bilateral anterior orbital gyrus and right superior temporal gyrus. At t=376ms 756 
source peaks were observed in the left anterior orbital gyrus, right frontopolar prefrontal 757 
 32 
 
cortex, left inferior frontal gyrus and left temporal pole. c) Clusters in sensor-time space with 758 
significantly greater negative correlations in the frontal pole for longer trial windows 759 
(thresholding as panel a). d) The t-maps (right) show location of the significant differences 760 
between window lengths at the peak time point of the significant cluster. This was localised 761 
(right) to the left inferior frontal gyrus, left anterior orbital gyrus and right superior frontal 762 
gyrus (thresholding as panel b).  763 
Figure 5. The correlations between MEG peak t-scores for TE (a) and SE (b) and the TE-SE 764 
correlations for individual participants. Best fit linear regression lines and their standard errors 765 
are superimposed. There is a significant negative correlation for TE (Pearson’s r=-0.55, n=18, 766 
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